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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
BY JOHN M. ROGERS* and MICHAEL H. SIMs**
I. THE STATE OF DE Novo REVIEW IN KENTUCKY
The Kentucky appellate courts each decided cases in the
past three years clarifying the availability and scope of "de
novo" review of state administrative agency actions. These re-
cent decisions illustrate that while Kentucky law largely re-
tains the classic elements of traditional de novo review, it has
also developed some unconventional qualities. Principally,
these differences involve the burden of proof the Kentucky
courts impose when review is de novo and the deference the
Kentucky trial courts, as reviewing bodies, are to accord
agency decisions.
Generally, "review of a decison of an administrative body
is limited to determining whether the body's decision is sup-
ported by substantial evidence, or [put another way,] whether
[the] decision is unreasonable or arbitrary."' When a statute
permits,2 however, the review of the administrative body's de-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1970, Stanford Uni-
versity; J.D. 1974, University of Michigan.
** J.D. 1981, University of Kentucky.
I Carter v. Craig, 574 S.W.2d 352 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). Recent cases applying the
substantial evidence rule in Kentucky include Hocker v. Fisher, 590 S.W.2d 342 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1979); Hart County Bd. of Educ. v. Broady, 577 S.W.2d 423 (Ky. Ct. App.
1979); Williams v. Cumberland Valley Nat'l Bank, 569 S.W.2d 711 (Ky. Ct. App.
1978); Kirk v. Jefferson County Medical Soc'y, 577 S.W.2d 419 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978);
and Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Department of Revenue, 551 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. Ct. App.
1977). Generally, these cases agree that "there is deference to the trier of facts and
agency determinations are to be upheld if the decision is supported by substantial,
reliable, and probative evidence found within the record as a whole." Hocker v.
Fisher, 590 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
2 Generally, de novo review is a creature of statute. Although no Kentucky case
has expressly indicated that de novo review requires a statutory grant, no Kentucky
case has allowed de novo review without benefit of a statutory grant. But see text
accompanying notes 46-48 infra for a possible exception to this general statement. In
Osborne v. Bullitt County Bd. of Educ. 415 S.W.2d 607 (Ky. 1967), the high Court of
Kentucky cited language indicating that de novo review is a choice made by the legis-
lature. The Court said: "A legislature should be free to assign them [questions for
determination] first to an agency with trial de novo by a court rather than the usually
limited appropriate review." 415 S.W.2d at 612 (citing L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINisTRATrmv ACTION 103 (1965)). See also 2 AM. JUR. 2d Administrative Law § 697
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cision can be "de novo." A de novo review means "trying the
matter anew the same as if it had not been heard before and
as if no decision had been previously rendered."' Thus, the
subsequent review is not a review of the previous hearing's
record alone but is an independent review, unrestrained by
any compelled deference to the agency decision.
A. Brady v. Pettit
In Brady v. Pettit,4 the Kentucky Supreme Court clari-
fied the initial question of precisely when review may be de
novo.5 Brady involved a discharged employee's demand for a
trial de novo under the provisions of Kentucky Revised Stat-
utes (KRS) section 67A.290, which expressly provides for de
novo review.$ The trial court, however, refused to hear the
(1962).
Apparently, the statute need not directly state that "de novo review is available";
rather this right may be implied from the statute. In Carter v. Craig, 574 S.W.2d 352
(Ky. Ct. App. 1978), the court held that a statute provided for de novo review where
it read:
The teacher shall have a right to make an appeal both as to law and as to
fact to the circuit court. . . .The court shall examine the transcript and
record of the hearing before the board of education and shall hold such
additional hearings as it may deem advisable, at which it may consider
other evidence in addition to such transcript and record.
Id. at 354.
3 See Louisville & Jefferson County Plan. & Zoning Comm'n v. Grady, 273
S.W.2d 563 (Ky. 1954); 2 Am. JUR. 2d Administrative Law § 698 (1962).
" 586 S.W.2d 29 (Ky. 1979). The petitioner raised a first amendment claim; how-
ever, the Court chose to dispose of the claims solely on procedural grounds. Id. at 31.
5 The Brady case involved a former personnel director of the Lexington, Fayette
County Urban Government who accused Mayor Foster Pettit of attempting to place
"political allies" in jobs by manipulating the civil service rules. These statements
were printed in a Lexington newspaper on three occasions, and the mayor subsequen-
tly filed charges under Ky. REv. STAT. [hereinafter KRS) § 67A.280 (1980), which
statute sets forth the standard and procedure for dismissal, suspension or reduction
of urban county government employees. The Civil Service Commission determined
that the personnel director had a duty to air his grievances with his superiors before
publicly declaring the charges. The Commission concluded that the director had "un-
dermined public faith in the personnel system and caused a disruption of communi-
cation between himself and other persons in the executive branch of government."
Thereafter, the Commission discharged the director. 586 S.W.2d at 30.
a KRS § 67A.290 (1980) provides in part;
(1) any employe of the urban-county government found guilty by the civil
service commission of any charges as provided by KRS § 67A.280. . .may
appeal to the circuit court of the county in which the urban county govern-
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case de novo and instead decided the case on the agency re-
cord. The trial court's refusal to hear the case de novo was
based on American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville and
Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission.8 The
Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the trial court's refusal to
hear the case de novo, holding that the trial court's reliance
on American Beauty Homes was misplaced.9 American
Beauty Homes, a 1964 zoning reclassification case,10 had held
that "statutes providing for trial de novo in circuit court of
administrative matters decided by appropriate bodies violates
the constitutional doctrine" of separation of powers. 1 1 2 The
Court asserted in American Beauty Homes that a contrary
decision would unjustifiably allow the legislature to impose an
administrative duty on the courts. 3 The imposition of the
zoning commission's "identical duties" upon the courts would
make the initial proceedings before the commission "a mock-
ery," and, in light of this presumed violation of the separation
of powers doctrine, the novo proceeding was unconstitu-
ment is located within thirty (30) days after such action becomes final
(2) Upon request in writing by the accused . . . the secretary of the civil
service commission shall file a certified copy of the charges and the judg-
ment of that body in the circuit court. Upon the transcript being filed, the
case shall be docketed in the circuit court and tried de novo.
7 586 S.W.2d at 30.
a 379 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1964).
B 586 S.W.2d at 31.
'o Appellant was the owner of a tract of land zoned for one family residential use
only. He had sought to have this classification changed to a D-1 commercial district.
The zoning commission had denied his request, and the circuit court, on a trial de
novo under KRS § 100.057(2) (1971), had affirmed the holding of the commission. See
American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Jefferson County Plan. & Zoning Comm'n, 379
S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1964).
11 The constitutional doctrine is most explicitly supported by section 27 of the
Kentucky Constitution, which provides:
The powers of the government of the Commonwealth of Kentucky shall be
divided into three distinct departments, and each of them be confined to a
separate body of magistracy. To wit: those which are legislative, to one;
those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to
another.
Ky. CONST. § 27. See also 379 S.W.2d at 453.
1 586 S.W.2d at 31.
379 S.W.2d at 454.
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tional. 14 The Supreme Court in Brady, however, held that
subsequent decisions had drastically diminished the scope of
American Beauty Homes."5 Although the Court agreed that
American Beauty Homes retained some usefulness in zoning
cases,16 the Court found that de novo hearings may be re-
quired without impairing the separation of powers require-
ment.17 The Court did not explain why, if it did not violate
the separation of powers requirement, the American Beauty
Homes standard was still useful in zoning cases.
The Court's limitation of the American Beauty Homes
doctrine to zoning cases may reflect a belief that the zoning
area is one, in particular, where the courts should pay more
deference to the administrative body involved. Zoning classifi-
cations involve matters affecting the whole community and
are, therefore, in many cases, more quasi-legislative in nature
than are employee discharges. A dispute between a discharged
employee and a discharging agency has a much smaller degree
of impact on the community as a whole and typically involves
issues of a quasi-adjudicative nature. A perhaps comparable
distinction is that between determinations of "legislative fact"
(used to make public policy decisions) and determinations of
"adjudicative fact" (used to make decisions on individual
rights). This distinction is used to determine whether a party
has a right to a trial-type hearing before an administrative
agency in the first place.' 8 Considerations that make a trial
14 Id. at 455.
16 586 S.W.2d at 31. See generally City of Glasgow v. Duncan, 437 S.W.2d 199
(Ky. 1969); Story v. Simpson County Bd. of Educ., 420 S.W.2d 578 (Ky. 1967); Os-
borne v. Bullitt County Bd. of Educ. 415 S.W.2d 607 (Ky. 1967); Kilburn v. Colwell,
396 S.W.2d 803 (Ky. 1965).
"I "Wle conclude that American Beauty Homes now applies only to zoning mat-
ters and matters of like nature. A separate rule of law in de novo situations has
developed in situations involving the discharge of teachers, policemen, firemen, and
the like." 586 S.W.2d at 31 (emphasis added). The court gave no indication of what
constitutes "matters of like nature."
17 The court relied in part on Osborne v. Bullitt County Bd. of Educ., 415
S.W.2d at 607. That case foreshadowed the Brady decision by holding that American
Beauty Homes was limited to "zoning" and "other administrative acts" and implied
that public employees would operate within the confines of the City of Owensboro v.
Noffsinger standard, discussed below. See text accompanying notes 19-27 infra for a
discussion of the Noffsinger standard.
18 Compare Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) with Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v.
[Vol. 69
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type hearing inappropriate for quasi-legislative determina-
tions may also make de novo court review inappropriate for
such determinations.
The court in Brady also made clear what de novo review
really means in Kentucky. The court reaffirmed its confidence
in a "preponderance test," as stated in the earlier Kentucky
case of Owensboro v. Noffsinger,19 and outlined the effect of
de novo review on the burden of proof. Noffsinger, relying on
prior case law, 20 had stated that the standard of review is:
not whether the administrative decision finds reasonable
support in substantial evidence, but whether or not the cir-
cuit court, hearing witnesses anew, acting as a fact-finding
body, from a consideration of all the evidence heard in the
circuit court, is of the opinion that the evidence heard in the
circuit court preponderates against the decision made by the
commission.
21
The high Court had more recently stated that this test of pre-
ponderance has "the practical effect. . .[of] shifting the bur-
den of proof to the appealing party, which means that the re-
view is something less than purely de novo."22 If review were
"purely" de novo, the reviewing court could decide the issue
independently of the agency's resolution of the issue. While
the Kentucky Court agrees that new evidence may be heard
and that the subsequent decision-maker should not apply the
more limited substantial evidence test, the Court will not al-
State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). See 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE §§ 12:1-:3 (2d ed. 1979).
280 S.W.2d 517 (Ky. 1955).
20 The standard of review was borrowed from Louisville & Jefferson County
Plan. & Zoning Comm'n v. Grady, 273 S.W.2d 563 (Ky. 1954). Grady involved a de
novo hearing on an applicaton for a change in a zoning classification; it was appar-
ently the first Kentucky case to inquire directly into the scope of de novo hearings. A
considerable portion of the opinion was devoted to a study of how other states had
defined the term "de novo."
2 Civil Service Bd. v. Fehler, 578 S.W.2d 254, 258 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (para-
phrasing Noffsinger).
22 Kilburn v. Colwell, 396 S.W.2d 803, 804 (Ky. 1965). In Kilburn a police officer
was discharged for misconduct; on appeal to the circuit court the case was tried de
novo and the dismissal was affirmed. Kilburn was granted a trial de novo under KRS
§ 95.460 (1971), which provided that "any member of the police ... found guilty by
the city legislative body of any charge . . . may appeal to the circuit court" and the
case would be tried de novo.
1980-81]
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low the total lack of deference to the agency that a pure de
novo hearing permits. Instead, the subsequent decision-maker
must decide whether the evidence, including new evidence,
heard before the circuit court preponderates against the deci-
sion made by the administrative body. Thus, in a pure de
novo jurisdiction no reference to the prior hearing need be
made, while the Kentucky courts will demand a reference
back to the decision of the agency to see if the evidence heard
by the subsequent decision-maker preponderates against the
prior decision-maker's decision.
In reaffirming its confidence in the Noffsinger standard,
the Brady Court held that
in public employee discharge cases where there is a trial de
novo statute, the discharged employee is entitled to some-
thing less than a classic trial de novo in circuit court....
[T]he burden of proof shifts to the discharged employee. Af-
ter review of the transcript of evidence or hearing the wit-
nesses, the trial court is limited in its decision. The trial
court may not substitute its judgment for that of the admin-
istrative body.... The trial court may find the discharged
employee has failed to meet the burden of proof and affirm
the action of the administrative board; or if it is found that
the employee has sustained the burden of proof, the trial
court may set aside the punishment.2 3
While reaffirming the Noffsinger standard, the Brady
Court "further refined" trials de novo by placing upon the dis-
charged employee the "obligation of producing the transcript
of evidence of the proceeding before the administrative
board. ' 24 The Court further held that a "corollary" to the
shifting of the burden of proof is a "review of the transcript of
evidence in the circuit court," but the de novo hearing is not
limited to a reexamination of this transcript. 5 Instead, the
discharged employee may call additional witnesses.26 The re-
view by the trial court, however, is limited to the same issues
11 586 S.W.2d at 32-33.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
[Vol. 69
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as were presented to the administrative agency.
B. City of Columbia v. Pendleton
The most recent attack on de novo hearings arose in City
of Columbia v. Pendleton.2" The city council had discharged
two police officers for violation of departmental rules. On de
novo review, the trial court employed the Noffsinger standard
and found that "the evidence preponderated against the deci-
sion of the City Council."2
The city argued that section 115 of the Kentucky Consti-
tution abolished de novo hearings, 30 but the court of appeals
disagreed and held that section 115's language that "appeals
shall be upon the record and not by trial de novo" 3' 1 applied to
appeals from "one court to another and not ... [to] appeals
from administrative agencies. 3 2 While an appeal from a trial
court to an appellate court cannot constitutionally be de novo,
review of an agency decision in a trial court is not in actuality
an "appeal" but is in fact treated as an "original" action.33 In
other words, for purposes of trial court jurisdiction and of the
Constitutional amendment dealing with subsequent appellate
jurisdiction, the complaint for review of administrative action
filed with the trial court is an "original" action and not an
"appeal," because there is no prior court action.34 The court
of appeals proceeded to hold that the trial court's application
of the Noffsinger standard of review was consistent with
Brady.3 5
27 See id.
28 595 S.W.2d 718 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
29 Id.
10 Section 115, adopted in 1975, provides in part: "In all cases, civil and criminal
there shall be allowed as a matter of right at least one appeal to another court ...
Appeals shall be upon the record and not by trial de novo." Ky. CONST. § 115 (1975).
31 Id.
2 595 S.W.2d at 718.
33 Id.
24 See Sarver v. County of Allen, 582 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1979).
25 595 S.W.2d at 719-20. The court of appeals said:
In any hearing of charges against a police officer the hearing body is faced
with two determinations. It must be determined first whether the officer
has violated the rules and regulations of the department and if so, the hear-
ing body must exercise its discretion in imposing a penalty. The first deter-
1980-81]
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C. Civil Service Board, City of Newport v. Fehler
Prior to Brady, the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Civil
Service Board, City of Newport v. Fehler6 determined the
standard of review for a de novo hearing consented to by the
parties.3 7 The case involved the dismissal of the Superinten-
dent of the Department of Public Works of the City of New-
port for alleged inefficiency and incompetence during a snow
emergency.38 Proceeding under a local city ordinance and
KRS section 90.360,39 the Newport Civil Service Board held a
hearing at which -both the Board and Fehler presented proof.
The Board, concluding that Fehler was guilty of the charges,
dismissed him. Fehler appealed to the circuit court, which
heard the case de novo by the consent of both parties. 40 The
mination is subject to judicial review, but the second is not.
Id. The city had argued that the trial judge had decided the officers had received "too
harsh a punishment." However, since the written findings of the trial judge held
merely that "the evidence preponderated against the decision of the city council" and
had exonerated the officers on this ground, the trial judge had not stepped outside
the confines of his discretion. Id.
36 578 S.W.2d 254 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
37 The court also examined whether 20 supplemental findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, filed more than ten days after the entering of a final judgment, fell
within the exception of CR 60.01, providing for relief from a judgment or order as to
"clerical mistakes" because of "oversight or omission." The court held they did not.
578 S.W.2d at 257.
11 Id. at 256. The dismissal stemmed from an allegation that Fehler had failed to
assemble a snow emergency crew in time to deal with the emergency. Fehler denied
that he was at fault. Testimony of Fehler and others (including the subsequently
hired superintendent of public works) demonstrated that it was the responsibility of
the crew foreman to assemble and dispatch the crews and not the responsibility of
the superintendent. Additionally, Fehler testified that he had attempted to call out a
crew earlier but had been unsuccessful in his attempts, partially due to his unfamili-
arity with the system. Id. at 256-57.
39 KRS § 90.360(1) (1980) provides:
No employe in the classified service of a city of the second or third class
shall be dismissed, suspended or reduced in grade or pay for any reason
except inefficiency, misconduct, insubordination or violation of law involv-
ing moral turpitude, or, in a city of the third class, violation of any rule
adopted by the city legislative body or civil service commission.
40 KRS § 90.370(1) (1980) provides that an employee found guilty under KRS §
90.360 (1980) "may bring an action in the circuit court," and KRS § 90.370(2) (1980)
provides that this action shall be "tried as an original action." It is unclear whether
this language is enough to constitute a statutory right to de novo review. Cf. Chandler
v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 860 (1976). Since both parties consented to the de novo re-
view, the question was not presented to the court. The statute involved in Osborne v.
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circuit court determined that the Board's findings were not
substantially supported by the evidence and ordered Fehler's
reinstatement.41 The Board appealed, arguing that certain af-
fidavits supporting Fehler, but not admitted at the hearing,
were inadmissible in the circuit court.42 The Board argued
that under KRS section 90.370(2) 43 evidence other than
presented at the hearing could not be presented to the circuit
court on review.44 The court of appeals, however, affirmed the
circuit court's decision.45
The Board's argument to the appeals court was notewor-
thy considering that the Board had consented to the de novo
review. 46 An argument that a statute's language precludes
from the trial court's consideration evidence other than that
evidence presented at the agency hearing reflects opposition
to de novo review. If the Board felt compelled to raise this
argument, it is unclear why it would initially consent to de
novo review. Also if the statutory language of KRS section
90.370(2) does not permit de novo review,47 the Fehler deci-
sion is significant in that the court has allowed a de novo
hearing on the basis of the parties' consent and not on the
basis of statutory intent. To the extent that the deference to
agency decision-making represented by the substantial evi-
dence standard is meant to further the interests of the admin-
istrative and judicial system (by efficiently allocating decision
making powers), rather than the interests of particular par-
ties, it could be argued that de novo review should not be
granted in the absence of statutory authorization, even when
the consent of the parties is given. The Kentucky Court of
Bullitt County Bd. of Educ., 415 S.W.2d at 607, did not provide expressly for a "de
novo" review. The Court did find the right to de novo review present where the stat-
ute read: "The teacher shall have a right to make an appeal both as to law and as to
fact to the circuit court." 415 S.W.2d at 612 (quoting from KRS § 161.790(6) (1980)).
See Carter v. Craig, 574 S.W.2d 352 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) and note 2 supra for a dis-
cussion of this latter statute.
41 578 S.W.2d at 256.
42 Id.
43 See note 40 supra for a description of KRS 90.370(2) (1980).
4 578 S.W.2d at 258.
4 Id.
46 Id. at 256.
47 See note 40 supra for a discussion concerning the statute's intent.
1980-81]
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Appeals may have implicitly rejected this argument.
The Fehler court held that the City of Owensboro v.
Noffsinger standard allowed the trial court to hear "addi-
tional evidence," saying "the standard does not confine [it] to
the transcript of [the] hearing. ' 4 Furthermore, the court ad-
ded, it was not necessary that the findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law entered by the trial court be expressed in terms of
"preponderance. '4 Instead, the trial court's contrary finding
that there was no evidence that Fehler was incompetent or
inefficient necessarily implied that the evidence preponder-
ated against the Board's determination. 0 This holding is con-
sistent with the idea that in trying a case de novo, a trial court
may proceed on judicial review as it would in an original ac-
tion. The circuit court, acting as a fact-finding body, hearing
witnesses anew, and considering all the evidence heard in the
circuit court, decides whether the evidence preponderates
against the administrative body's decision, rather than decid-
ing on the basis of substantial evidence.
In summary, de novo review of agency action is permitted
under the Kentucky Constitution in some but not all circum-
stances, where provided by statutes or perhaps by the consent
of the parties. But unlike "pure" de novo review, where the
reviewing court may decide the issue without deference to the
agency's decision, in Kentucky the reviewing court determines
only whether, after hearing all the evidence, including new
factual submissions, the evidence preponderates against the
decision made by the agency. The limited deference to agency
decision-making represented by this shifting of the burden of
proof to the challenger of agency action may in fact have
served to alleviate some of the Supreme Court's concern about
the constitutionality of statutorily mandated de novo review.
II. THE DELEGATION DOCTRINE
There has long been a dispute over whether the legisla-
48 578 S.W.2d at 258.
41 Id. at 259. The trial court's order of reinstatement was hence affirmed and
Fehler was awarded $12,801 for wrongful dismissal.
50 Id.
[Vol. 69
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ture, operating within a "separation of powers" framework,
may "delegate" certain legislative powers. The separation of
powers doctrine found in the federal and state constitutions,
coupled with the common law agency principle that a power
originally delegated cannot be redelegated, was used to devise
a "nondelegation doctrine. ' 51 This doctrine was "theoretically
based on the notion that, since our three traditional branches
of government exercise legislative, executive, and judicial pow-
ers constitutionally delegated by the people, those institu-
tions, in order to insure that they remain the sole repositories
of such power, should not be permitted to further delegate
their authority. '52 With the development of a modern indus-
trial society, however, it became necessary to tolerate a certain
degree of delegation in order to allow the law to respond to
the changing circumstances of a developing nation.53 Ken-
tucky, in an effort to respond to this change, adopted an "ade-
quate standards" test. The legislature could constitutionally
delegate certain legislative functions to an administrative
body if the legislature "set out an intelligible policy ' 54 for the
administrative body to utilize as a guide in its exercise of
power. In 1961, Kentucky abandoned the "adequate stan-
dards" test in favor of a "safeguards" test.5  As long as there
were "safeguards" against abuse, the delegation would be con-
stitutional. Two recent Kentucky Court of Appeals cases, al-
though subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court, reflected
uncertainty in the application of the safeguards test, without
regard to "adequate standards."
51 Ziegler, Legitimizing the Administrative State: The Judicial Development of
the Nondelegation Doctrine in Kentucky, 4 N. Ky. L. REv. 87 (1977).
52 Id. The sections of the Kentucky Constitution utilized to attack the delegation
of legislative power are §§ 27-29 (separation of powers), § 60 ("no law ... shall be
enacted to take effect upon the approval of any other authority than the General
Assembly") and § 2 (precludes the state from taking "absolute and arbitrary power
over the lives, liberty and property of freemen"). Id. at 92.
53 Commonwealth v. Associated Indus. of Ky., 370 S.W.2d 584 (Ky. 1963). See
Ziegler, supra note 51, at 100.
" Youngs v. Willis, 203 S.W.2d 5 (Ky. 1947).
15 Butler v. United Cerebral Palsy of North. Ky., Inc., 352 S.W.2d 203 (Ky.
1961).
1980-81]
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A. The Federal View
The "adequate standards" requirement initially appeared
in the early 1930's.5' The courts reasoned that a necessary de-
gree of tolerance could be accomplished if the legislative body
would state "an intelligible principle," with the administrative
authority merely "fill[ing] in the details. 5 7 In other words,
the legislature would remain the principal lawmaking body,
while the administrative agency's rulemaking would be secon-
dary and subordinate. 8
To understand the requirement fully, it is important to
examine federal law. The United States Supreme Court has
purported to apply an adequate standards test.59 In an early
statement of the adequate standards test, the Court said:
The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the
Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practical-
ity, which will enable it to perform its function in laying
down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to
56 United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 282 U.S. 311 (1931). "Congress
cannot delegate any part of its legislative power except under the limitation of a pre-
scribed standard. . . ." Id. at 324.
11 Butler v. United Cerebral Palsy of North. Ky., Inc., 352 S.W.2d at 207-08 (Ky.
1961). See 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 2.01-.16 (1958).
"I Ziegler, supra note 51, at 100.
59 "[C]ongress may delegate the exercise of its regulatory power, under proper
standards . . . ." Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conf. 345 U.S. 128, 133
(1953). "[Ilt then becomes constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the
general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this
delegated authority." American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946).
The mandate of the Constitution [article 1, § 1] that all legislative powers
granted "shall be vested" in Congress has never been thought to preclude
Congress from resorting to the aid of administrative officers or boards as
fact-finding agencies whose findings, made in conformity to previously
adopted legislative standards or definitions of congressional policy, have
been made prerequisite to the operation of its statutory command.
Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, Dept. of Labor, 312 U.S. 126, 144 (1941).
We have repeatedly recognized the necessity of adapting legislation to com-
plex conditions involving a host of details with which the national legisla-
ture cannot deal directly. We pointed out in the Panama Company case
that the Constitution has never been regarded as denying to Congress the
necessary resources of flexibility and practicality which will enable it to per-
form its functions in laying down policies and establishing standards, while
leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within
prescribed limits ....
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-30 (1935).
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selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules
within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to
which the policy as declared by the legislature is to apply.60
The Supreme Court has only twice held a delegation of
power to an administrative body unconstitutional,6 1 and both
of those decisions occurred during the time of judicial resis-
tance to the New Deal and are now over forty-five years old.
The Court's restraint in striking down delegations for this
lengthy period of time may mean there is no longer a real pos-
sibility of a statute's being rejected on the theory that it is an
unconstitutional delegation of power. Recently, however, an
indication has come from at least one member of the Supreme
Court that rejection of a statute on that ground is still a possi-
bility. Justice Rehnquist, concurring in Industrial Union De-
partment v. American Petroleum Institute,62 noted that the
Court should "once more take up its burden of ensuring that
Congress does not unnecessarily delegate important choices of
social policy to politically unresponsive administrators. '63 Ob-
serving that legislative delegations of authority to administra-
tive agencies are generally supported by a need for expertise,6 4
10 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). This case involved an oil
producer's attack on regulations instituted by the Secretary of the Interior and
designed to enforce an executive order of the President, under the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act, which would have prohibited the transportation of excess petro-
leum in interstate and foreign commerce. In Panama, the Court held that the regula-
tions were an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
61 Id.; Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Cases up-
holding delegations include: United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157
(1968); American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Atchinson, T. & S.F. R. Co., 387 U.S. 397
(1967) (upheld broad delegations of power); United States v. Chicago M., St. P. & P.
R.R., 282 U.S. 311 (1931); Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928) (did
not discuss the need for an "adequate standard" but did indicate that a delegation of
power would not be forbidden if Congress laid down an "intelligible principle").
02 448 U.S. 607, 671 (1980) (Rehnquist, J. concurring). This case involved a chal-
lenge by the American Petroleum Institute of certain OSHA regulations defining the
standards by which toxic material was to be handled in the work place. The Court
invalidated the regulations. Four of the five vote majority reasoned that the regula-
tion did not meet the requirements of the OSHA Act as interpreted by the Court.
Justice Rehnquist concurred on the ground that the Act inadequately set standards
for the agency to use in promulgating regulations.
3 Id. at 686.
04 The many later decisions that have upheld Congressional delegations of
authority to the Executive Branch have done so largely on the theory that
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Justice Rehnquist thought the legislation involved "fail[ed] to
pass muster" 65 on this basis and, furthermore, expressed a de-
sire to return to the reasoning of the two early Supreme Court
cases striking certain legislative delegations as unconstitu-
tional.66 While there are circumstances in which adequate
standards can be derived in order to save a legislative delega-
tion, Rehnquist did not believe any particular conditions sup-
plied standards adequate to save the delegation involved.67
The four vote plurality in Industrial Union (with whom
Rehnquist concurred in judgment) apparently reaffirmed their
belief in the early case law striking particular statutes as un-
constitutional delegations, 8 although, unlike Rehnquist, they
did not believe the nondelegation doctrine was applicable in
the instant case. This reaffirmation, coupled with the fact that
Justice Rehnquist was the swing vote in the four-one-four de-
cision, may indicate that the federal nondelegation doctrine is
not completely dead.
Congress may wish to exercise its authority in a particular field, but be-
cause the field is sufficiently large, and the members of Congress themselves
not necessarily expert in the area in which they choose to legislate, the most
that may be asked under the separation-of-powers doctrine is that Congress
lay down the general policy and standards that animate the law, leaving the
agency to refine those standards, "fill in the blanks," or apply the standards
to particular cases.
Id. at 675.
6I !d.
66 See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
11 Justice Rehnquist indicated that, other than the need for expertise, there were
five conditions from which standards could be drawn to sustain a delegation of legis-
lative authority. 448 U.S. at 671 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The courts could deter-
mine if there were standards expressed within the statute's legislative history that
might save the delegation. Another suggestion was that the courts look at the "pur-
pose" of the act and the "context" in which it was passed. See American Power &
Light Co. v. SEC, 239 U.S. 90 (1946). The courts might also look at "pre-existing
administrative practice," i.e., how the agency has acted in the past and how Congress
has reacted to this action. See Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948). The
courts might also look to whether the delegated area is one in which a delegate has
"residual authority," such as in the area of foreign affairs. See United States v. Cur-
tis-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). Finally, the courts might look to see
whether it is feasible for Congress to draw the necessary guidelines. See 329 U.S. at
90.
66 The Court pointed out that Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining may ap-
ply where the statute constitutes a "sweeping delegation." 448 U.S. at 646.
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Recent lower federal court decisions have only expressed
by way of dictum that it is possible to fail the adequate stan-
dards test."9 A 1964 federal district court case exemplifies the
conception of the test in the federal courts. Brotherhood of
Local Fire & Engineers v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
R.R. 70 involved an action to impeach and to set aside an
award of a special arbitration board created by Congress to
impede an imminent rail strike. Standards such as
"'[a]dequate and safe transportation service to the public';
'interests of the carrier and employees affected';" and "'due
consideration to the narrowing of the areas of disagreement
which has been accomplished in bargaining and mediation', 7 1
were upheld as adequate. 2 While standards are required by
the federal courts, the court said, "[t]he law, however, does
not require that the standards and guides be defined with the
accuracy and precision of a mathematical formula. . . . It is
sufficient if Congress indicates a general criterion or an aim to
serve as a guide to the administrative agency. '73
B. The Davis View
While the federal courts have continued their support of
the adequate standards test, Kentucky has abandoned it in
favor of the "safeguards" test. The reasoning supporting this
test is that standards are not necessary where certain proce-
dural safeguards exist. The major proponent of the safeguards
test, Professor Kenneth Davis, suggests a number of safe-
69 See Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. Hutton, 608 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1979). The
argument in Plum Creek that the statute was an unconstitutional delegation due to
inadequate standards was rejected by the court on the ground that it had not been
argued in the district court and was thus untimely. Notwithstanding this, the court
said the argument was not persuasive. A standard is required, but "it is evident the
standards need not be precise." 608 F.2d at 1288. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters 337
F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971); see also Upholstered Furniture v. California Bur. of
Home Furnish., 442 F. Supp. 565 (E.D. Cal. 1977); Rite Aid Corp. v. Board of Phar-
macy, 421 F. Supp. 1161 (D.N.J. 1976). In all of these cases the delegations were
upheld; in the last two cases the courts considered state statutes delegating legislative
authority.
70 225 F. Supp. 11 (D.D.C. 1964).
71 Id. at 23. See 45 U.S.C.A. § 157 (1963).
7'2 225 F. Supp. at 23.
73 Id. at 22.
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guards which typically exist in "frameworks of procedural
safeguards, plus executive, legislative or judicial checks." 74
The salient issue is:
not what the statute says but what the administrators do.
The safeguards that count are the ones the administrators
use, not the ones mentioned in the statute. The standards
that matter are the ones that guide the administrative deter-
mination, not merely the ones stated by the legislative body.
The test should accordingly be administrative safeguards
and standards, not statutory safeguards and standardsY.
In other words, the safeguards test could be met even if it is
the administrative body itself that is responsible for establish-
ing the necessary procedural safeguards. Davis believes dele-
gation without standards is necessary if a modern administra-
tive agency is to complete its task effectively in today's
complex scheme of government.7 6 Only by permitting the
agency to develop its own safeguards will flexibility be
achieved.
Davis, however, does not completely reject the proposi-
tion that legislatures should design statutory standards. In-
deed, he states that:
legislative bodies should clarify their purposes to the extent
that they are able and willing to do so, but when they choose
to delegate without standards, the courts should uphold the
delegation whenever the needed standards to guide particu-
lar determinations have been supplied through administra-
tive rules or policy statements.77
If the legislative body fails to adopt a standard, a court would
not hold the delegation unconstitutional but would require
the agency to provide the required safeguards as "rapidly as
feasible."78 The purpose behind nondelegation should not be
to require statutory standards but should be to protect
against "unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary power."'
11 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3:15, at 210 (2d ed. 1978).
75 Id. at 211.
78 Id. at 208.
7 Id. at 212.
78 Id. at 207.
7 Id. at 206.
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Davis contends that administrative standards will be just as
effective as statutory standards in curbing agency abuse of
discretion.
C. Adequate Standards vs. Safeguards in Kentucky
Kentucky made the transition to the safeguards test in
Butler v. United Cerebral Palsy of Northern Kentucky, Inc.80
The Butler case involved an attack on the validity of a statute
authorizing "public aid to private institutions for the educa-
tion of 'exceptional children.' "81 The Superintendent of Pub-
lic Instruction for Kentucky challenged the statute, arguing
that the authorization of public aid to provide schools for the
education of "exceptional children" left the required eligibil-
ity determination to the "untrammelled discretion" of the su-
perintendent or the state board.2 In other words, the superin-
tendent was arguing that the term "exceptional children," by
which the authorization of public funds was to be made, was
an inadequate standard. Indicating that the need for stan-
dards was "mumbo-jumbo," 83 the Court upheld the statute,
saying "the need is usually not for standards but for safe-
guards.'84 The Court's reasoning was basically that advanced
by Davis: that safeguards are desirable in order to insure the
agency has limits to its discretionary power.85 Further, the
Court accepted the "agency flexibility" argument presented
by Davis, stating:
The difficulty is that it is often affirmatively desirable for
the legislative body to avoid either intelligible principle or a
clear delineation of the general policy, for the simple reason
that many questions of basic policy may better be worked
out by an agency than by a legislative body.8"
Finally, the Court suggested, as Davis had supposed'8 7
80 352 S.W.2d 203 (Ky. 1961).
11 Id. at 204.
82 Id. at 205.
" Id. at 207 (citing 1 K DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.11 (1958)).
352 S.W.2d at 207.
See id.
" Id. at 208.
1, Legislatures, especially in closing hours of a session, are often less respon-
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that the practical requirements of Kentucky's state govern-
ment required the use of the safeguards test. The Court said:
The members of the legislature are allowed to meet in regu-
lar session only 60 days every two years. They have neither
the time, facilities, nor qualifications to do more than indi-
cate the class and fix the amount to be spent. At the state's
disposal, however, is its board of education, an agency fully
and better qualified than the legislature to establish and
carry out whatever further policies and procedures may be
necessary or desirable. This body also is one of the most re-
sponsible and long-established agencies of the state
government.88
Moreover, the Court believed discriminatory or arbitrary
behavior on behalf of a state administrative body would be
practically impossible due to the inherent right of judicial re-
view of discriminatory behavior.8 9 Although the Court did not
expressly indicate which particular safeguards it relied upon
to uphold the act, the inherent right provided by the state
constitution to judicial review of discriminatory action 90 and
the court's faith in the school board as a responsible agency91
seem to have been most important to the Court.
Subsequent Kentucky cases have reaffirmed the use of
the safeguards test. Commonwealth v. Associated Industries
of Kentucky92 involved a delegation of power to the State
sible than Congress; their draftsmen are often less skillful in clarifying leg-
islative intent; direct responsiveness to special-interest groups is often more
pronounced; committee investigations are usually less thorough; delegations
to petty officers is more common; and especially, safeguards to protect
against arbitrary action are generally less developed.
1 K. DAvis, supra note 74, § 2.06.
88 352 S.W.2d at 208.
8I Id.
Id. Ziegler says that this inherent right is provided by § 2 of the Kentucky
Constitution. Ziegler, supra note 51, at 109. Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution
reads: "Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of freemen
exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority." Ky. CONST. § 2.
" 352 S.W.2d at 208.
9' 370 S.W.2d 584 (Ky. 1963). See also Holsclaw v. Stephens, 507 S.W.2d 462
(Ky. 1973); Kentucky State Bd. of Business Schools v. Electronic Computer Program-
ming Inst., Inc., 453 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1970); Commonwealth Dept. of Child Welfare v.
Lorenz, 407 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1966) (all upholding statutory delegations on the basis
of the safeguards test).
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Commissioner of Economic Security, allowing the Commis-
sioner to enter into reciprocal agreements with the federal and
other state governments, which would permit those sovereigns
to fix by their laws the eligibility criteria, amount, and dura-
tion of unemployment benefits for Kentucky citizens under an
interstate unemployment compensation plan.9 3 Overruling
earlier case law" precluding this form of delegation to other
sovereigns, the Court held that the Kentucky Constitution did
not prohibit this delegation of legislative power to other
states9 5 and found "the laws of other states or of the federal
government to be a sufficient and effective safeguard."' Addi-
tionally, the Court viewed the legislature's power to revoke
the delegation an an important safeguard.9 7
It is possible, however, to fail the safeguards test in Ken-
tucky. In Miller v. Covington Development Authority, 8 the
Court relied on the safeguards test to invalidate a statute del-
egating power to determine historical and economically signif-
icant areas for preservation to independent development au-
thorities in first and second class cities.99 The Court found
that the authorities' power was not restricted by statutory
standards or safeguards, and said that leaving the authorities
to determine which areas were historically or economically
significant was not a sufficient safeguard to prevent abuse of
discretion.100 The safeguards of a "long established adminis-
trative agency. . . with a track record of experience and ex-
pertise in a well recognized field"101 did not exist under the
statute involved. Moreover, the powers delegated were not so
93 See KRS § 341.145 (1972).
91 Dawson v. Hamilton, 314 S.W.2d 532 (Ky. 1958).
91 370 S.W.2d at 586.
"Id. at 589.
97 Id. at 588.
98 539 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1976).
99 KRS §§ 99.610-.680 (Cur. Supp. 1980) was the statute involved. The author-
ity consisted of a mayor and seven commissioners, given prominent discretionary
power in the area of "preservation and revitalization of historically or economically
significant local areas." Id. KRS § 99.610 (Cur. Supp. 1980). Such authorities were
authorized to acquire property, make loans, make grants, construct housing, and issue
bonds. 539 S.W.2d at 2-3.
100 539 S.W.2d at 4.
101 Id.
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complex that it would be unrealistic not to vest them in an
administrative agency.10 2 A city or county government could
itself determine the preservation area. Also, the term "eco-
nomically significant area" was inadequately defined by the
legislature. 103 For these reasons, the Court found the statute
an impermissible delegation.
While these earlier cases seem to adopt the safeguards
test, two recent cases involving the extent to which the Ken-
tucky Human Rights Commission is empowered to award
monetary damages for embarrassment and humiliation suf-
fered as a result of unlawful discrimination 0 4 showed an un-
certainty by the Kentucky Court of Appeals over which dele-
gation test to apply.
In Kentucky Commission on Human Rights v. Bar-
bour,105 the Commission made the finding, following a full
public hearing,106 that an employer had unlawfully discrimi-
nated against one of the complainants on the basis of race and
awarded $750.000 in damages for the appellant's embarrass-
ment and humiliation. 0 7 The Commission "did not explain
why that particular sum was appropriate."10 8 Stating that the
Commission's action was a "usurpation of judicial author-
ity," 0 9 the Franklin Circuit Court, on review, refused to
award the damages in the belief that the statute was an un-
constitutionally vague and overbroad delegation of legislative
power.
The act in question provides:
102 Id.
103 Id. The Court also indicated that legislative delegations of city or county
powers may be less necessary than delegations of state legislative powers. Id. at 4-5.
104 KRS § 344.230 (1972), permits the Commission to pursue a number of forms
of affirmative action if the Commission discovers, based on its findings of fact and
conclusions of law, that the relief granted was warranted. It should be noted also that
KRS § 344.230(3) (1972) states that "affirmative action ordered under this section
may include but is not limited to" the forms of action detailed by the statute. Id.
(emphasis added).
-05 587 S.W.2d 849 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979), rev'd, No. 81-SC-35-T (Ky. 1981).
106 The hearing was held "according to the procedures set out in KRS Chapter
344 and 104 Kentucky Administrative Regulations § 1:020." 587 S.W.2d at 850.
107 Id.
100 Id.
109 Id.
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Payment to the complainant of damages for injury caused
by an unlawful practice including compensation for humilia-
tion and embarrassment, and expense incurred by the com-
plainant in obtaining alternative housing accommodations
and for other costs actually incurred by the complainant as
a direct result of such unlawful practice.110
The circuit court criticized the fact that the act contained "no
standards or guidelines for the exercise of the discretion""',,
bestowed by the statute upon the Commission and reversed
the Commission's award. Noting that the statute imposed no
"monetary ceiling" 1 2 upon the amount of damages that can
be awarded for embarrassment and humiliation, the court be-
lieved "that neither the provision that the award must be
based upon the commission's findings, nor the statutory provi-
sion for review in circuit court. . . cures the legislative failure
to limit recovery for embarrassment and humiliation."' 13
On appeal the Kentucky Court of Appeals noted that in
Butler v. United Cerebral Palsy of Northern Kentucky,
Inc.," 4 "the necessity for standards or guidelines accompany-
ing legislative delegations was expressly rejected. 11 5 Butler,
the Barbour case pointed out, "placed Kentucky in the fore-
front of states"' 0 relying on the safeguards test.
Rejecting the notion that the legislature was required to
"state an 'intelligible principle' and that the administrative
authority would merely 'fill in the details,' ""17 the Barbour
opinion proceeded to list five criteria by which a delegation
,11 KRS § 344.230(3)(h) (1972).
" 587 S.W.2d at 850.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 352 S.W.2d 203 (Ky. 1961).
,, 587 S.W.2d at 849.
116 Id. at 851. Davis emphasizes that "[a] good many state courts have been fol-
lowing that lead in emphasizing safeguards instead of standards." K. DAVIS, supra
note 74, at § 2.03. See generally Kugler v. Yocum, 445 P.2d 303 (Cal. 1968); Elk Run
Tel. Co. v. General Tel. Co., 160 N.W.2d 311 (Iowa 1968); Department of Health v.
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 242 A.2d 21 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968);
Schmidt v. Department of Resource Dev., 158 N.W.2d 306 (Wis. 1968).
117 352 S.W.2d at 207. "The notion that the courts must compel the legislative
body to state an intelligible principle to guide all exercise of delegated power wrongly
assumes that the only wisdom to be found in the various organs of government is
entirely concentrated in the legislative body." DAVIs, supra note 74, at § 2.03.
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should be judged when applying the safeguards test:
(1) whether provisions exist in the delegating statute suffi-
cient to determine that the powers delegated are confined to
a specific area of authority or are at least within an ascer-
tainable scope of authority;
(2) whether the delegation is to a newly created agency or to
a long established agency with a record of experience and
expertise in the field;
(3) whether significant decisions will be left to the untram-
melled discretion of the agency or if the agency is required
to establish criteria for its decisions by issuing regulations;
(4) whether agency decisions affecting the rights of individu-
als are inherently reviewable by the courts in Kentucky;
(5) whether the delegation is necessary in light of the practi-
cal needs of effective government.118
After reviewing these five criteria and agreeing they were
"helpful," the court concluded that the criteria did not totally
answer the question, particularly where some of the criteria
were met by the statute and others were not.119 While the
statute would satisfy points one and four, it would not satisfy
points two and three.120 Moreover, the outcome under the
fifth factor was, the court stressed, "a highly subjective
matter."
1 21
After commenting that it did not wish to "invalidate a
constitutionally marginal statute if such a course can be
avoided, 1 2 2 the court decided that it was unable to cure the
"statute's probable deficiency" by creating a dollar limit.1 23
1'8 587 S.W.2d at 851. The court took the criteria from Ziegler, supra note 51, at
118.
19 587 S.W.2d at 851.
120 Id. at 852.
"2 Id. Concerning the fifth factor the court stated:
[N]either our research nor that of the parties has disclosed another statute
in any jurisdiction within the United States which authorizes damages for
embarrassment and humiliation without placing a dollar limit on those
damages. Any argument that a provision allowing such damages without
statutory limitation is "necessary in light of the practical needs of effective
government," has obviously not taken the legislatures of our nation by
storm.
Id. at 852.
122 Id.
123 Id.
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The court, however, avoided the problem by determining that
it was not necessary to decide the constitutionality of the stat-
ute,124 and reversed and remanded the case on an alternative
ground. Requiring "strictest compliance with the provision
that affirmative action must be in accordance with the Com-
mission's findings of fact" and therefore requiring "detailed
written findings" to support damages for embarrassment and
humiliation, the court remanded the case to the Commission
to "set out with particularity the nature and degree of the in-
jury suffered.' 1 25 As discussed at the end of this survey, the
Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the holding of the court
of appeals in Barbour.1
26
Another recent opinion of the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals, Kentucky Commission on Human Rights v. Fraser,127
also complicates Kentucky nondelegation law. The Fraser
case seems to be a limited backward step toward an applica-
tion of the adequate standards test. Fraser involved an award
under KRS section 344.230(3)(h) of damages for job-related
sex discrimination based on alleged humiliation and embar-
rassment. 28 The court of appeals adopted the lower court's
opinion in its entirety2 ' and, despite an apparent expression
of confidence in the basic principles espoused in Barbour, °30
124 Id.
125 Id. Certain suitable factors to discuss, the court said, were:
1) the number of persons exposed to the defendant's conduct;
2) the number of encounters during which the claimant was exposed to be-
havior inducing embarrassment or humiliation;
3) whether the actions of the defendant caused humiliating public exposure;
4) any evidence of severe emotional damage; and
5) the presence or absence of aggravating factors such as abusive language.
126 See text accompanying notes 148-55 infra.
127 27 Ky. L. SumhM. 11, p. 4 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) [hereinafter cited as KLS],
rev'd, No. 80-SC-633-DG (Ky. 1981).
128 The employee claimed that she was fired because she was pregnant. Id.
121 Id. at pp. 4-7.
,30 The court of appeals said that Barbour dealt "honestly and fairly with certain
grave and complex circumstances" but that
[t]he trouble with most litigation, and certainly the more complex cases, is
not so much the basic right of each case in which general and fundamental
principles are laid down; rather it is the slight factual changes in each case
with the attempt slowly but surely to keep adding the subtle expressions of
principles of law until it finally embraces concepts and doctrines never ini-
tially intended.
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determined that the statute was unconstitutional for lack of
standards. Although the circuit court, in the opinion adopted
by the court of appeals, did not believe the employee had suf-
ficiently shown adequate humiliation and embarrassment to
justify the award,"" it held that even assuming she clearly Was
embarrassed and humiliated, the Commission did not have a
proper standard upon which to base an award.1 32 "[A]n award
for humiliation and embarrassment is simply beyond review
as to reasonableness by any measurable standard,"1 33 said the
court.
Even though the court acknowledged the fundamental
principles of Barbour, the language of the opinion indicated
reliance on a standards test rather than on a safeguard test.
Holding that an award for humiliation and embarrassment is
constitutionally beyond the powers of the Commission' was
remarkable in light of Kentucky's long-standing confidence in
the safeguards test 35 and the Barbour opinion's reaffirmation
of that confidence.
Although the Fraser and Barbour holdings were recently
reversed,138 they do indicate difficulty with the application of
Id. at p. 4.
131 The court said: "There is simply no proof of humiliation or embarrassment on
the part of Mrs. Cooper. Neither Mrs. Cooper nor any witness testified to her being
humiliated ... or embarrassed... or to any facts that would warrant that conclu-
sion." Id. at p. 6.
132 Id.
13 Id.
134 Id. The adopted opinion stated that this suit, which was by its nature a per-
sonal tort and not a business-oriented injury, belonged in a court of law and not a
"politically appointed administrative body." Id.
'" Kentucky presumably has followed the safeguards test since the decision in
Butler v. United Cerebral Palsy of North Ky., 352 S.W.2d 203 (Ky. 1961).
1'6 As noted, the opinion adopted by the court of appeals consisted almost whol-
ly of the lower court's opinion. While the lower court's "reasoning and conclusions"
were incorporated "in their entirety," the court of appeals also felt constrained to say
that it did "not agree with all the philosophies, analogies, and illustrations of the
lower court." 27 KLS 11, at p. 4. In particular, the lower court confused its scope of
review (substantial evidence), with the standard of proof before the agency (prepon-
derance of the evidence). The lower court seemed to say that it must find the evi-
dence to preponderate in order to uphold the agency decision. If that were its mean-
ing, the circuit court was wrongly applying de novo review when the statute clearly
requires the more deferential "substantial evidence" scope of review. See text at note
1, supra. Cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). In reversing
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the safeguards test by the lower courts. The difficulty lies pri-
marily in Davis' belief that the nondelegation rule and the ad-
equate standards test are important only as stopgaps against
an agency's possible abuse of its power.137 Standards, however,
are at least theoretically required by the separation of powers
doctrine. Legislative bodies should be responsive to the de-
mands of the people electing them, but Davis would allow the
legislature to leave to the administrative body the determina-
tion of what standards to apply.138 Unelected agencies, how-
ever, might not apply the standards or make the policy deci-
sions desired by the electorate. Requiring statutes to be
promulgated with adequate standards limits the legislature
from granting an agency governmental tasks ordinarily subject
to the political process.
Professor Davis also contends that leaving the determina-
tion of standards to the agency will promote efficiency because
of the agency's increased flexibility.139 If in fact efficiency is
increased, 140 this efficiency is gained at the expense of the pol-
icies underlying the separation of powers doctrine. In fact, the
standards requirement may promote more effective legislation
because of the legislature's need to "be more specific in stat-
ing how it wants the administrative agency to execute the
statute.'41 Administrators then could use these statutory
standards to "determine whether the contemplated action
corresponds with that which is expected of them."
1 42
Davis also argues that judicial review is one safeguard
against potential agency abuse; but if a standard is not availa-
ble, how can a court determine whether an agency-inspired
Fraser, the Supreme Court of Kentucky stated that interpretation of the standard of
review by the lower courts was "clearly wrong," and reaffirmed the substantial evi-
dence test. Fraser, No. 80-SC-633-DG, slip op. at 7-8 (Ky. 1981).
137 See 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 74, at § 3.15.
13 Id. at 211-14.
1,9 See id. at 208.
140 There may be a question as to whether a requirement of adequate standards
really impedes efficiency. Considering the hesitancy of the federal courts to overrule
broad delegations, and their desire to uphold broad standards, the standards require-
ment would not appear to impede efficiency by decreasing agency flexibility.
"I Comment, State Statutes Delegating Legislative Power Need Not Prescribe
Standards, 14 STAN L. REV. 372 (1962).
142 Id.
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rule exceeds the intended delegated power? 143 Statutes with
adequate standards allow for an easier determination of
agency abuse. Contrary to Davis' assumption,14 4 agencies may
not always act both reasonably and in the public interest. If
the legislature establishes standards, even if the standards are
broad, abuse would be easier to detect and simpler to deal
with.
Even Kentucky's adoption of the safeguards test is not
wholly what Davis proposes. In Davis' view, if an agency is
reversed on judicial review because it acted outside the intent
of the legislature in applying a standardless statute, the
agency is simply allowed to formulate standards in the fu-
ture. 1 45 The statute is thus cured of its unconstitutional
problems and is saved from invalidation. Kentucky, however,
in Miller v. Covington Development Authority, 4 invalidated
a statute under the safeguards test without saving the statute
by permitting the agency to formulate adequate standards of
its own. The Court reasoned that the safeguards provided by
a delegation to a "long established administrative agency...
with a track record of experience and expertise in a well
recognized field,"' 47 did not exist under the statute involved.
Perhaps the Court is not willing to extend to every agency the
power to formulate its own standards for standardless delega-
tions. While the Kentucky courts may believe the adequate
standards test is "mumbo-jumbo," the Miller case indicates
that they are not yet willing to adopt the Davis safeguard the-
ory entirely.
As noted above, the Kentucky Supreme Court has very
recently reversed the court of appeals decisions in Barbour
and Fraser.48 Reaffirming Butler, the Court stated that the
143 Ziegler contends that forcing the statute to be "intelligible" vU safeguard
against abuse. Ziegler, supra note 51, at 117. Yet requiring a statute to be "intelligi-
ble" is requiring the statute to contain some standard that makes it "intelligible."
144 See 1 K. DAvis, supra note 74, at § 3.15.
145 Id.
146 539 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1976).
147 Id.
14' Kentucky Commission on Human Rights v. Barbour, No. 81-SC-35-T (Ky.
Dec. 15, 1981); Kentucky Commission on Human Rights v. Fraser, No. 80-SC-633-DG
(Ky. Dec. 15, 1981).
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general test for delegation of powers to an administrative
agency is that of "safeguards, procedural and otherwise, which
prevent an abuse of discretion by the agency. ' 149 The Court
found the requisite safeguards in
(1) . . . the presence of agency regulations, 104 KAR
1:010 et seq., (2) the provision for a full due-process
hearing, KRS 344.200 et seq. and 104 KAR 1:020, (3)
the agency's experience in making similar determina-
tions, and (4) the provision for judicial review, KRS
344.240.150
The Court accordingly found that the Civil Rights Act provi-
sion was constitutional,151 and that evidence supported the as-
sessment of damages in each case.152
The Court also decided that the statute was not an un-
constitutional usurpation fo the judicial power despite the
fact that the Commission is involved in adjudication. In con-
trast to the argument made in American Beauty Homes'"
that a statute providing for de novo review violates the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine by imposing administrative duties
on courts, the argument here was the reverse: that a statute
providing for agency adjudication, with only substantial evi-
dence review, violated the separation of powers doctrine by
imposing judicial duties on administrative agencies. The
Court rejected this contention, noting that agencies are fre-
quently involved in the adjudication of disputes. The Court
relied on the availability of a due process hearing, the availa-
bility of judicial review, and the fact that "the statute ade-
1 .4149 Kentucky Commission on Human Rights v. Fraser, No. 80-SC-633-DG, slip
op. at 5.
150 Id.
"5' In reaching this conclusion, the Court also decided that the absence of a jury
trial in Human Rights Commission cases does not violate the right to jury trial in
civil cases contained in section 7 of the Kentucky Constitution. The Court reasoned
that the right involved is a creature of statute, the statute prescribes a proceeding for
the adjudication of that right in an administrative forum without a jury trial, and
"where a right is created by statute and committed to an administrative forum, jury
trial is .not required." Id. at 3-4. Justice Sternberg dissented on this point.
112 Justices Stephenson and Sternberg dissented on the issue of the adequacy of
the evidence for the assessment of damages.
"' See text accompanying notes 8-17 supra for a discussion of American Beauty
Homes.
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quately defines the prohibited conduct. '154 The Court repeat-
edly emphasized the last factor.15 5 Thus, while not examining
the adequacy of standards under the nondelegation doctrine
itself, the Court did rely on the presence of such standards in
upholding the statute against a direct separation of powers
argument.
In summary, the safeguards test, following some uncer-
tainty, has been reaffirmed as the proper test in applying the
nondelegation doctrine in Kentucky. The degree to which the
Kentucky courts have adopted the views of Professor Davis in
their entirety is not as clear. There are difficulties in applying
a doctrine based on the separation of powers to achieve the
related but distinct goal of avoiding agency arbitrariness, diffi-
culties reflected in the reluctance of the lower courts to dis-
pose of the adequate safeguards standard requirement alto-
gether. At least where agency adjudication is involved, the
Supreme Court may require "adequate definition" by statute
of the rights and duties involved.
M4 Kentucky Commission on Human Rights v. Fraser, No. 80-SC-633-DG, slip
op. at 5-6.
"' The Court relied on the presence of "statutory guidelines" and subsequently
on the fact that "prohibited conduct has been well defined by the governing statute."
Id. at 6.
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